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Abstract
Mongolia combines a near absence of domestic poultry, with an abundance of migratory waterbirds, to create an ideal
location to study the epidemiology of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in a purely wild bird system. Here we
present the findings of active and passive surveillance for HPAIV subtype H5N1 in Mongolia from 2005–2011, together with
the results of five outbreak investigations. In total eight HPAIV outbreaks were confirmed in Mongolia during this period. Of
these, one was detected during active surveillance employed by this project, three by active surveillance performed by
Mongolian government agencies, and four through passive surveillance. A further three outbreaks were recorded in the
neighbouring Tyva Republic of Russia on a lake that bisects the international border. No HPAIV was isolated (cultured) from
7,855 environmental fecal samples (primarily from ducks), or from 2,765 live, clinically healthy birds captured during active
surveillance (primarily shelducks, geese and swans), while four HPAIVs were isolated from 141 clinically ill or dead birds
located through active surveillance. Two low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) were cultured from ill or dead birds
during active surveillance, while environmental feces and live healthy birds yielded 56 and 1 LPAIV respectively. All
Mongolian outbreaks occurred in 2005 and 2006 (clade 2.2), or 2009 and 2010 (clade 2.3.2.1); all years in which spring HPAIV
outbreaks were reported in Tibet and/or Qinghai provinces in China. The occurrence of outbreaks in areas deficient in
domestic poultry is strong evidence that wild birds can carry HPAIV over at least moderate distances. However, failure to
detect further outbreaks of clade 2.2 after June 2006, and clade 2.3.2.1 after June 2010 suggests that wild birds migrating to
and from Mongolia may not be competent as indefinite reservoirs of HPAIV, or that HPAIV did not reach susceptible
populations during our study.
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Introduction
Since its emergence in 1997 and subsequent re-emergence in
2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype
H5N1 has caused the deaths of at least 357 people in 15 countries
[1] and been responsible for losses of many millions of domestic
poultry, negatively impacting economic growth and food security
in affected countries. Prior to 2005, outbreaks in wild birds were
sporadic, associated with high mortality, and thought to relate to
spillover from infected domestic poultry [2–6]. This situation
changed in April 2005, with an outbreak among wild migratory
waterbirds at Qinghai Lake in northern China, when over 6,000
wild birds died over a period of two months [7–9].
Following events at Qinghai, there was a marked increase in
outbreaks involving wild birds elsewhere in Asia, Europe and
Africa. However, the extent to which wild birds contributed to the
spatial expansion of HPAIV outbreaks, particularly in relation to
that of the legal and illegal movement of wild and domestic fowl is
difficult to resolve [10,11]. Many outbreaks involving wild birds
occurred in close proximity to cases among domestic poultry [12],
making it difficult to attribute the source of infection to a wild or
domestic host. In such environments, it can be difficult to isolate
the contribution that wild birds play in cycles of HPAIV
transmission [13].
In response to the Qinghai outbreak, a wild bird surveillance
system was implemented in Mongolia in 2005 to elucidate the role
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of wild birds in the transmission of HPAIV H5N1. Bird species
show variable susceptibility to infection with HPAIV H5N1, with
experimental exposures resulting in high mortality rates among
swans, geese and gulls [14,15], and variable levels of mortality or
subclinical infections in ducks [15–17] Active surveillance
approaches involved searching for the presence of HPAIV through
screening diagnostic specimens from healthy, ill and dead birds
and from the environment. In contrast, passive surveillance relied
on reports of sick and dead birds received from the general public,
who were requested to report waterbird mortality to provincial
veterinary authorities.
Several features make Mongolia an ideal location for under-
standing the epidemiology of HPAIV in wild birds. Mongolia
supports large populations of migratory waterfowl and shorebirds
[18], including species breeding across Mongolia’s extensive
wetlands during the boreal summer, then departing to spend the
winter in milder climates in Australasia, the Indian Subcontinent,
Africa, Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and Japan [19–23]. HPAIV
H5N1 is either endemic or has occurred in domestic and/or wild
bird populations in all these areas except for Australasia. Other
species visit Mongolia for short periods to feed while migrating to
and from more northerly breeding areas. Mongolia also represents
an important site for molting Anseriformes (ducks, geese and
swans) that congregate during the post-breeding period when early
frosts force them to vacate their Siberian breeding sites.
Mongolia presents an opportunity to study virus in wild
populations in isolation from domestic poultry. It has a small
domestic poultry industry with a population of fewer than 100,000
birds in 2005 [24], an overall density of ,1 km22 [25], with most
birds raised for egg production in moderately biosecure facilities
located in urban centers. In contrast, China produces approxi-
mately 5,900,000,000 domestic birds annually [26]. To date,
Mongolia’s modest poultry population has remained free from
HPAIV outbreaks. With little backyard production, the potential
for wild birds being exposed to domestic sources of virus is
negligible, allowing conclusions to be drawn on the status and
transmission of HPAIV in wild bird populations without the
complication of local spillover from domestic hosts.
Herein we report the seven-year findings of this surveillance
program, including the success of various approaches of active and
passive surveillance in detecting HPAIV outbreaks, together with
the results of investigations once they were detected. Isolates of low
pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) in Mongolia have
been reported elsewhere [27], and so will only be summarized
briefly here. The implications of the project findings are discussed
both with respect to future surveillance efforts, as well as to




Lying between the latitudes of 42uN and 51uN, Mongolia is a
vast, land-locked country of approximately 1.5 M km2, that
extends east-west across 2,500 km of Central Asia between Russia
and China. Although a country of climatic and geographic
extremes, much of the land area consists of open steppe,
transitioning to taiga forest in the north and the Gobi Desert in
the south and west. Wetlands and lakes of variable size fleck the
landscape, with approximately 3,000 rivers stretching over
67,000 km in the north [28]. Mongolia is populated by just over
three million people, over half of which depend directly or
indirectly on the traditional nomadic system of livestock produc-
tion, raising goats, sheep, cattle, yaks and horses [29].
Active Surveillance
Active surveillance was directed at the detection of HPAIV
outbreaks (defined for the purposes of the study as presence of one
or more clinically ill or dead birds from which HPAIV could be
isolated), and the presence of HPAIV in clinically unaffected birds.
Detection of outbreaks relied on the collection of samples from
dead or ill birds located along shoreline transects; while collection
of samples from live birds showing no clinical signs of illness and
environmental fecal deposits were used to detect the subclinical
presence of virus. The approaches used each year are summarized
in Table 1. Surveys were conducted in four main regions, the ‘east’
(referring to Ulaanbaatar and the aimags (provinces) of Dornod,
Khentii and Sukhbaatar), the ‘west’ (Uuvs and Khovd), the ‘south-
central’ (Bayankhongor, Zavkhan and Gov-Altai), and the ‘north-
central’ (Khovsgol, Bulgan and Arkhangai).
Live Bird Sampling
Live, apparently healthy birds were captured using a number of
methods; none were killed for the purposes of this study. Live bird
sampling focused on waterbirds particularly Anseriformes (includ-
ing Anas ducks, shelducks, geese and swans), and Ciconiiformes
(including gulls, cormorants and shorebirds). Molting Anseri-
formes were captured in groups, by driving birds into temporary
holding pens, or individually at night with use of spotlights and
nets or swan hooks. Shorebirds were caught at night using mist
nets, and hand nets were used to catch cormorants and gulls.
Tracheal and cloacal swabs were collected from each bird and
stored individually in cryovials containing viral transport media
(VTM). Oropharangeal swabs were collected instead of tracheal
swabs from smaller bird species. Samples were held at 4uC up to
four hours and then immersed in liquid nitrogen. Cold chain was
maintained throughout delivery of samples to the laboratory. In
2006, 2007 and 2008, a duplicate set of respiratory and cloacal
samples were collected and stored in cryovials containing 10%
guanidine isothiocyanate solution (2007), or a solution of 1%
Environ One-Stroke (2006 and 2008), for molecular analysis.
Dead/sick Bird Sampling
Shoreline transects were delineated at each site and systemat-
ically searched for sick and dead birds. Where possible they
completely circumnavigated the water body, or at least exceeded
5 km on larger lakes. Birds were identified when possible to
species, sex, age and general approximate time since death.
Obvious signs of predation or scavenging were recorded and a
photo record made of each bird. Where species could not be
determined due to carcass condition, identity was recorded to the
highest taxonomic level possible or simply listed as ‘‘unknown’’.
Swab samples were collected in the same manner described for live
birds. Where possible, tissues from brain, lung, spleen and
pancreas were also snap frozen in VTM for virus isolation.
Fecal Sampling
Fresh fecal samples were collected where waterbirds were
observed congregating or roosting. Samples were collected and
preserved in the same manner as those collected from live birds. In
2005 and 2006 sampling focused on single-species flocks to enable
the identification of the species being sampled. This led to a bias
toward certain species that were less likely to form mixed-species
groups, particularly shelducks, geese, swans, gulls and cormorants.
From 2009 onward, our collection strategy changed to include
species that habitually congregate in mixed-species groups
(particularly focusing on ducks in the genera Anas and Aythya,
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus, Mongolia
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which are prominent carriers of LPAIVs), sacrificing specific
identity of the birds being sampled.
Passive Surveillance
Reports of sick and dead birds from herders, local veterinary, or
environmental officials were relayed via the district and province
veterinary offices to the State Central Veterinary Laboratory
(SCVL) in Ulaanbaatar, with samples or whole birds collected by
national or provincial investigation teams submitted for laboratory
testing at SCVL. Samples collected from suspect cases were
forwarded to the OIE Reference Laboratory at Hokkaido
University for confirmation.
Outbreak Investigation
Reports of suspected outbreaks were relayed to the study team
to enable follow-up outbreak investigations to take place.
Standardized counts were performed at each outbreak site using
recognized guidelines [30]. Point counts were supplemented with
active searching to provide a more comprehensive list of species
present at each site. Where feasible, attempts were made to
capture and sample live birds at outbreak sites, and to collect fecal
samples from areas where birds were congregating.
Diagnostics
All samples were submitted for virus isolation, except in 2006,
and 2007 when inactivated duplicate samples were screened using
real-time RT-PCR (rRT-PCR) [31]. Corresponding samples in
VTM to those positive by rRT-PCR were then submitted for virus
isolation. In 2008 all samples were screened using virus isolation of
VTM samples and rRT-PCR of inactivated duplicates. Virus
isolation was accomplished in 10-day old specific-pathogen-free
embryonated chicken eggs using described procedures [32].
Hemagglutinating agents from virus isolation attempts were
confirmed as type A influenza by antigen capture and rRT-PCR
[33]. Viruses were pathotyped using chicken pathogenicity tests
and sequencing of the H5 hemagglutinin proteolytic cleavage site
[32,34].
Processing of samples using RT-PCR took place in several
laboratories, therefore the procedures were not identical. In 2006
total RNA was extracted with a procedure optimized for cloacal
swab samples. The RNA was screened for AIV by rRT-PCR using
a standard protocol [33]. The rRT-PCR test was run with an
internal positive control [35] to ensure that inhibitors were not
causing false negative results. All rRT-PCR positive samples were
processed for virus isolation in embryonated chicken eggs and
were screened for H5 subtype virus with subtype specific primers
and probes [36,37]. Samples from 2007 and 2008 were processed
at the University of California, Davis as follows: RNA was
extracted from swab samples using the MagMAX- 96 Viral
Isolation Kit (Ambion Inc. Austin, TX) in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions. An rRT-PCR which targets the M
gene was conducted as described by Runstadler, et al. [38,39]
which was the standard test in this laboratory and run on an AB
7500 Real-Time PCR System (Applied Biosystems, Foster City,
CA).
Amnio-allantoic fluid from eggs inoculated for virus isolation,
testing positive for hemagglutination, an indicator virus presence,
were processed for RNA and run on the AIV type A rRT-PCR to
confirm virus presence. Regardless of the initial rRT-PCR result
the subtypes of all isolates were confirmed by sequencing [27]. We
assumed an individual was negative for HPAIV H5N1 if all tests
conducted on samples from that individual were negative.
Ethics Statement
Bird capture and handling permits covering all four regions of
Mongolia (east, west, north-central and south-central) were issued
by the Mongolian Ministry of Nature, the Environment and
Tourism following approval of handling and sampling protocols by
the Institute of Biology at the Mongolian Academy of Sciences,
with additional approval from the University of Minnesota,
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Protocol
1006A84613).
Results
In total, eight outbreaks of HPAIV were recorded in Mongolia
during the study period (Table S5), with three more occurring
within Russian territory along the shores of Uuvs Nuur, a lake that
bisects the international boundary (Table S7). These eleven
outbreaks occurred at just five sites (with three outbreaks each
recorded at Erhel Nuur and Uuvs Nuur). An additional report of
three dead whooper swans found at Zegst Nuur in Sukhbaatar
province on 5 April 2011 (Ref OIE: 10500) was not considered to
constitute a confirmed outbreak, as the diagnosis was based on
RT-PCR and rRT-PCR for H5 only, and no virus could be
isolated.
Active Surveillance
Active surveillance was conducted in all seven years at 61
locations (Figure 1, Table 1). Overall, 10,761 individual birds
were sampled using active surveillance (Table 2, and Tables S1
and S3), but only one outbreak of HPAIV H5N1 was identified
using the methods employed by this study, at Erhel Nuur in the
north-central region on 28 July 2009, when isolates of HPAIV
H5N1 were recovered from three dead juvenile Mongolian gulls
Larus mongolicus. Although the outbreak at Erhel Nuur in 2009
was detected during active surveillance, further details are
Table 1. Summary of active HPAIV surveillance approaches employed in Mongolia, from 2005–2011.
Activity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Live bird sampling Limited Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Faecal sampling? Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Mortality transects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of survey sites 9 42 12 10 11 23 17
Geographic regions NC, SC E, W, NC, SC NC NC W, NC E, NC E
Timing Jul-Aug Jul-Oct Apr-Oct May-Sep Jun-Sep May-Sep May- Oct
Geographic regions are East (E), West (W), North-central (NC), and South-central (SC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044097.t001
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provided in the section reporting the results of outbreak
investigations for comparative purposes. A further three
outbreaks were detected by active surveillance undertaken by
Mongolian government agencies at Khunt Nuur (May 2006),
Erhel Nuur (May 2006) and Doroo Tsagaan Nuur (July 2009).
A total of 56 LPAIVs were isolated from environmental fecal
samples (n = 7,855), one from live clinically healthy birds
(n = 2,765) and two from dead or ill birds (n = 141) sampled
during active surveillance. In 2006 6.9% of samples tested positive
for the matrix gene (n = 2,678), compared to 9.4% in 2007
(n = 508) and 9.4% (n = 1,377) (Table S3). Of 363 samples testing
Figure 1. Map of study sites. Boundaries of study regions illustrated (white =West; light grey, white border = East; dark grey =North-central; light
grey, dark border = South-central).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044097.g001
Table 2. Summary of the number of individual birds sampled during active surveillance in Mongolia 2005–2011.
Surveillance type Order 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Grand Total
Live bird ANSERIFORMES 0 8 315 794 731a 48 0 1,896
CICONIIFORMES 0 9 148 475 160a 0 0 792
PICIFORMES 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
PASSERIFORMES 0 8 0 0 0 67 0 75
Faecal ANSERIFORMES 413 1,265 0 0 720 1,521 2,400 6,319
GRUIFORMES 15 0 0 0 0 0 15
CICONIIFORMES 35 1,345 0 0 140 0 0 1,520
PASSERIFORMES 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sick/dead ANSERIFORMES 1 10 4 1 3b [1] 0 0 19
CICONIIFORMES 0 15 40 52 8b (3) 1 0 116
FALCONIFORME 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
UPUPIFORMES 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
PASSERIFORMES 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 4
Total 449 2,678 508 1,322 1,765 1,639 2,400 10,761
In 2008 samples were submitted for culture in embryonated eggs, and RT-PCR, the results obtained for culture are represented here.
HPAIV H5N1 viruses identified by virus isolation (VI) are indicated in parentheses, and those identified by real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
are indicated in square brackets.
aFigures include 197 live, clinically healthy Anseriformes, and 83 Ciconiiformes sampled on Erhel Nuur between 28 July and 1 August 2009, a period that coincided with
an outbreak of HPAIV H5N1 that was subsequently confirmed through laboratory analysis.
bFigures include one sick ruddy shelduck, and three dead juvenile Mongolian gulls at Erhel Nuur in July-August 2009 that subsequently tested positive for HPAIV H5 by
rRT-PCR, and HPAIV H5N1 by virus isolation respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044097.t002
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positive for matrix sequences only two tested positive for H5 (a
fecal sample from a red crested pochard, Rhodonessa rufina, and a
cloacal sample from a red-necked stint Calidris ruficollis), but no
virus was isolated from the duplicates of these samples. In 2008
when all samples were tested by both RT-PCR and virus isolation,
only one LPAIV was isolated, from a sample testing negative by
RT-PCR for the matrix gene (from a live ruddy shelduck Tadorna
ferruginea).
Passive Surveillance
Of the eight Mongolian outbreaks, four were detected through
passive surveillance at Khunt Nuur (July 2005), Erhel Nuur (July
2005), Doitiin Tsagaan Nuur (May 2009) and Ganga Nuur (May
2010) (Table S5).
Outbreak Investigation
Five outbreak investigations were completed during this study,
including Erhel Nuur (June 2005), Uuvs Nuur (June 2009), Doroo
Tsagaan Nuur (August 2009), and Ganga Nuur Nature Reserve
(May 2010). Although the outbreak at Erhel Nuur in 2009 was
identified during active surveillance, activities performed were
consistent with those at outbreak investigations and are reported
here.
Population numbers, densities and species identification of live
birds were obtained during each of the five outbreak investigations
(Table S4). Due to the size of Uuvs Nuur, we were unable to
survey birds across the entire surface area of the lake. We
estimated the area surveyed at Uuvs Nuur, by assuming that all
birds could be reliably identified and counted up to 2 km from the
shoreline (estimated on-site using maps), and multiplying this
against the length of shoreline surveyed. Counts made at all other
sites represent the entire surface area of the lakes. Ganga Nuur
Nature Reserve data combines surveys of its main water bodies
(Ganga Nuur, Kholbo Nuur, Erdene Nuur and Huuvur Nuur).
Fifteen sick or dead birds suitable for sample collection were
identified during outbreak investigations, with a further four
located at Erhel Nuur in July 2009 (Table 3 and Table S2).
HPAIV H5N1 virus was isolated from eight of these birds, with an
additional three testing positive for HPAIV subtype H5 virus by
rRT-PCR. Among birds testing positive by rRT-PCR was a dead
great crested grebe Podiceps cristatus at Uuvs Nuur in June 2009.
This bird, found 19.2 km from the border with the Russian
Federation, remains the only case of HPAIV H5 on the
Mongolian shores of Uuvs Nuur.
Capture of live, clinically healthy birds was only possible during
the outbreak investigations at Erhel in 2005 (2 birds) and Doroo
Tsagaan Nuur in 2009 (91 birds) (Table 3 and Table S2). A further
279 live birds were captured during active surveillance at Erhel
Nuur in July 2009 (Table 2 and Table S1) which was later
identified as an outbreak. No HPAIV H5N1 virus was isolated
from any of these birds.
A total of 723 fecal samples were collected during outbreak
investigations, from which no isolates of HPAIV H5N1 virus were
recovered.
Discussion
Although confirmed outbreaks of HPAIV, subtype H5N1 in
Mongolia occurred during four of the seven study years, our active
surveillance was only successful in identifying one outbreak (Erhel
Nuur, July 2009). In six of the seven years of surveillance sampling
of live birds (either through capture or collection of fecal samples)
concentrated on ruddy shelducks, bar-headed geese Anser indicus
and whooper swans Cygnus cygnus as these species were over-
represented among dead birds found at outbreaks (Tables S1, S2,
S3 and S5). A total of 2,504 of these birds were sampled during
active surveillance, and 503 during outbreak investigations, but no
HPAIV was isolated. Duck species within the genera Anas and
Aythya that may be more likely to harbor subclinical HPAIV
infections [15,17] were under-represented during captures, which
led to the decision to increase collections of fecal samples from
these species in 2009, 2010 and 2011. A total of 4,401 samples
were collected from these species during active surveillance and
292 during outbreak investigations, but also failed to yield HPAIV
isolates. Taken together these findings suggest that sampling of live
birds (through capture and fecal sampling) are either insensitive at
detecting outbreaks, or that the species targeted were inappropri-
ate.
Although considerably fewer samples were collected from ill and
dead birds, these yielded HPAIV isolates both during active
surveillance (three juvenile Mongolian gulls at Erhel Nuur in July
2009) and outbreak investigations (one whooper swan at Erhel
Nuur in 2005, two ruddy shelducks and a bar-headed goose at
Doroo Tsagaan Nuur in 2009, and one tundra swan Cygnus
columbianus at Ganga Nuur in 2010). Since at least half of the
confirmed Mongolian outbreaks were identified by means of
passive surveillance, and sick and dead bird sampling accounted
for all HPAIV isolates, passive surveillance and investigation of
mortality incidents may be the most cost-effective method of
identifying outbreaks of HPAIV in wild birds in Mongolia and
possibly other countries. However, with 59 LPAIVs isolated
during active surveillance, the wider value of this approach to
understanding influenza ecology should not be discounted.
Table 3. Summary of the number of individual birds sampled during outbreak investigations in Mongolia 2005–2011.
Surveillance type Order 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Grand Total
Live bird ANSERIFORMES 1 0 0 0 91 0 0 92
CICONIIFORMES 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Faecal ANSERIFORMES 412 0 0 0 141 151 0 704
CICONIIFORMES 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
Sick/dead ANSERIFORMES 4 (1) 0 0 0 4 (3) 1 (1) 0 9
CICONIIFORMES 2 0 0 0 4 [1] 0 0 6
Total 439 0 0 0 240 152 0 831
HPAIV H5N1 viruses identified by virus isolation (VI) are indicated in parentheses, and those identified by real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
are indicated in square brackets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044097.t003
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Due to the variation in strategies of laboratory analysis used
during the study, it is conceivable that our ability to detect HPAIV
may have been lower in some years compared to others. In
particular, the pre-screening of duplicate samples using RT-PCR
in 2006 and 2007 may have resulted in missing viruses among
samples that were negative by RT-PCR and therefore not
submitted for virus culture. Indeed, in 2008 an LPAIV was
isolated from a ruddy shelduck that tested negative using RT-PCR
exemplifying this possibility. However, overall RT-PCR was found
to be more sensitive than virus culture in detecting viruses, with
363/4,563 (7.96%) found positive by RT-PCR compared to 79/
8,406 (0.94%) by virus isolation. This is not unexpected, as unlike
virus isolation, RT-PCR will detect both viable and non-viable
virus.
The low density of poultry in Mongolia, coupled with the lack of
any recorded outbreaks among Mongolian poultry strongly
supports the hypothesis that wild birds are responsible for carrying
HPAIV H5N1 to Mongolia. Furthermore, Mongolian cases only
occurred in years when wild bird outbreaks were also reported in
either Qinghai or Tibet during April or May (Figure 2; Table S7).
The species that predominated in the Qinghai and Tibet
outbreaks were similar to those that died in Mongolia (with the
exception of brown-headed gull Chroicocephalus brunnicephalus which
is uncommon in Mongolia). All isolates obtained from Mongolia in
2005 and 2006 fell within the same subclade as those obtained
from Qinghai and Tibet during the same period (clade 2.2), while
those obtained in 2009 and 2010 also clustered with viruses
obtained from the Qinghai and Tibetan outbreaks within these
years (clade 2.3.2.1). This trajectory of outbreaks is consistent with
wild birds migrating northwards along the Central Asian
migratory flyway during the spring, a route that is followed by
birds wintering in southwestern China and the Indian subconti-
nent. Notably, these clades have also been isolated among
domestic poultry in India (clade 2.2), Nepal (clade 2.3.2.1) and
Bangladesh (both clades) [40–42]. Further isolates of clade 2.3.2.1
viruses among wild birds in Hong Kong in the winter of 2007/8
[43], in Japan during spring 2008, and again in Japan and the
Korean Peninsula during the winter 2010/11 [44] suggest that this
clade has also been moving along the East Asian Australasian
flyway, at least to the latitude of southern China. HPAIV appears
to have persisted in wild birds in the Central Asian migratory
flyway for a minimum of 15 months in the case of both clade 2.2
and clade 2.3.2.1 (Tables S5, S6, S7), although the possibility of
multiple reintroductions from infected domestic poultry elsewhere
in the flyway cannot be discounted. However, based on the lack of
any isolates of clade 2.2 from wild birds in the Central Asian
flyway after June 2006, or clade 2.3.2.1 after June 2010 we
hypothesize that while wild bird populations can support HPAIV
infections for a limited period, they have not represented a
competent reservoir in the long term. Testing this hypothesis
would require that surveillance effort be increased across the
flyway, with an emphasis on the reporting and investigation of
dead birds.
The timing and location of HPAIV outbreaks on Mongolian
waterways have shown a generally similar temporal and spatial
distribution (Figure 2), with all outbreaks starting between early
May and the end of July, and restricted to six locations. While the
narrow spatial and temporal distribution of Mongolian outbreaks
could be related to biases in surveillance locations, we do not
believe this is the case. Combined with passive surveillance, which
exhibits less temporal bias, Mongolian authorities have also
implemented an extensive active surveillance program since
2006, targeting 97 wetland areas across 12 provinces, taking place
at least twice a year.
Ecological factors are likely to play an important part in the
seasonal distribution of outbreaks. Outbreaks in early May
coincide with the arrival of spring migrants from southern
wintering areas, including China and South Asia (mostly
Anseriformes), and further south for many other species. Counts
of birds obtained from April through October at Erhel Nuur in
2007 (Figure 3) illustrate how bird numbers vary during the period
from spring thaw to autumn freeze. Although absolute numbers of
birds are relatively small in early May, the continuation of ice
coverage forces waterbirds into small areas of open water, which
increases their density more than at other times of year. For
instance, a total of 2,062 birds counted on Erhel Nuur on 5 May
2007 (a date equivalent to the outbreak the previous year) equates
to a density of 2,222 birds km22 based on a visual estimate that
95% of the lake surface was frozen. This is higher than the bird
densities recorded at any other time at this site. Furthermore, in
early May melting ice reduces the salinity of surface water to near
zero (even on lakes that are markedly brackish for the remainder of
the summer) (pers. obs.). However this effect is temporary and
once all ice has melted (by mid to late May) the salinity rapidly
increases and remains at a near constant until the autumn freeze.
This dilution effect, coupled with low water temperatures may
enhance the environmental survival of virus at this time of year
[45].
The temporal delay in spring outbreaks in Uuvs Nuur (which
have all occurred in early June) from those in north-central
Mongolia are hard to explain. By early June spring migration is
essentially over, and birds are focused on nest building and raising
young. It may be that differences in the species assemblage (Table
S4), or peculiarities in breeding or feeding ecology at Uuvs Nuur
account for this difference (e.g. Uuvs Nuur supports large colonies
of several species such as great cormorant Phalacrocorax carbo,
Pallas’s gulls Larus ichthyaetus and Eurasian spoonbills Platalea
leucorodia, that are rarely found on outbreak lakes elsewhere in
Mongolia), but without further information this is difficult to
surmise. Although there were large numbers of birds recorded
during the surveys at Uuvs Nuur in June 2009, the estimated total
density (187 birds km22) was lower than recorded at all other
outbreak investigations (Table S4). Outbreaks initiated in late July
coincide with the highest numbers of birds on Mongolian lakes
(Figure 3). For instance, counts on Erhel Nuur during the outbreak
in July 2009 reached 12,278 birds, equating to a density of
662 birds km22. At this time many species, particularly ruddy
shelducks, congregate in large numbers to molt, at which time they
are completely flightless.
The observation that no Mongolian outbreaks have arisen in
the months of August, September or October is interesting, as
these months are traditionally when LPAIV subtypes reach their
peak prevalence in waterfowl populations in Europe and North
America [46,47]. These peaks of LPAIV subtypes are attributed to
greater densities of susceptible hosts as populations are swollen by
numbers of immunologically naı¨ve juvenile birds, which congre-
gate prior to the southward migration period. The lack of
Mongolian HPAIV outbreaks detected during the late summer
period suggests that the epidemiology of the virus may be quite
different from natural circulation of LPAIV subtypes, which are
typically less pathogenic for wild birds, although the possibility that
outbreaks have been missed cannot be excluded entirely.
In many cases the numbers of sick or dead birds observed
during outbreaks was unremarkable, exceeding 100 birds in only
four outbreaks, with as few as a single bird involved in others.
These numbers contrast with figures reported in China (Table S7),
where mortalities numbering in the hundreds is more usual, with
over 6,000 dead birds reported during the 2005 outbreak at
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Qinghai. This disparity could be related to smaller numbers of
birds on Mongolian lakes, and although total population estimates
are not available in many of the Chinese outbreaks, we feel that
this is unlikely. For instance, over 12,000 live birds were observed
during the outbreak on Erhel Nuur in 2009, yet only three dead
Mongolian gulls and a single ruddy shelduck were found despite
extensive searching over several days. These birds were all
flightless at the time of death, indicating that they had contracted
Figure 2. The spatiotemporal distribution of HPAIV outbreak onset from 2005–2011. All reported outbreaks are illustrated for the People’s
Republic of China during April and May (left column), and Mongolia, in two week intervals from May – July. Cells corresponding to periods during
which outbreaks were first reported are indicated in grey, and locations of outbreaks are indicated in black.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044097.g002
Figure 3. Monthly bird counts at Erhel Nuur from April to October 2007. Total number of birds present are indicated (solid squares),
together with counts of the predominant genera Tadorna (open diamond), Anas (open triangle), Aythya (open square), and Bucephala (open circle).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044097.g003
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the virus locally. A review of surveillance data from Sweden and
Denmark in 2006 also found that many outbreaks were associated
with unspectacular levels of mortality, with 75% detected through
singleton dead birds [48]. Although it is acknowledged that passive
surveillance systems that investigate individual bird deaths are
economically demanding, Mongolian findings indicate that not
doing so will negatively influence detection sensitivity.
Although presence or abundance of a species at an outbreak site
does not directly implicate it in the transmission of HPAIV, it may
be instructive to look for commonalities across outbreak locations.
Bird counts and species densities were assessed during five of the
eleven outbreaks (Table S4) and covered all of the lakes at which
outbreaks took place except Khunt Nuur. For this site, a census
was made on 3 May 2007 and was considered indicative of birds
present during the 4 May 2006 outbreak at that location. Only
eight species were found on all of the outbreak lakes (demoiselle
crane, whooper swan, ruddy shelduck, common goldeneye,
common pochard, northern pintail, Mongolian gull and pied
avocet). Ruddy shelduck was by far the most numerous species
observed, with almost twice as many present as the next most
abundant species on outbreak lakes. It has been postulated that
bar-headed geese may play a role in the transmission of HPAIV
across large distances in Asia [49–51], but this would not appear to
be the case in all of the Mongolian outbreaks. Although bar-
headed geese are common in the north-central region, they are
much less common in western Mongolia, and none were observed
in the vicinity of the 2009 outbreak on Uuvs Nuur, or the 2010
outbreak in Ganga Nuur Nature Reserve.
In conclusion, the occurrence of outbreaks in areas deficient in
domestic poultry is strong evidence that wild birds can carry
HPAIV over at least moderate distances. However, failure to
detect further outbreaks of clade 2.2 after June 2006, and clade
2.3.2.1 after June 2010 suggests that wild birds migrating to and
from Mongolia either are not competent as indefinite reservoirs of
infection or did not reach susceptible populations during our
study. For wild birds it appears that passive surveillance provides a
more cost effective approach to HPAIV detection than surveil-
lance of apparently healthy individuals.
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